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abstract
In this paper, I make explicit some implicit commitments to realism and conceptu-
alism in recent work in social epistemology exemplied by Miranda Fricker and
Charles Mills. I offer a survey of recent writings at the intersection of social
epistemology, feminism, and critical race theory, showing that commitments to
realism and conceptualism are at once implied yet undertheorized in the existing
literature. I go on to offer an explicit defense of these commitments by drawing
from the epistemological framework of John McDowell, demonstrating the
relevance of the metaphor of the “space of reasons” for theorizing and criticizing
instances of epistemic injustice. I then point out how McDowell’s own view
requires expansion and revision in light of Mills’ concept of “epistemologies of
ignorance.” I conclude that, when their strengths are used to make up for each
others’ weaknesses, Mills and McDowell’s positions mutually reinforce one
another, producing a powerful model for theorizing instances of systematic
ignorance and false belief.
1. introduction
In this paper, I critically examine some trends in recent social epistemology concerning the
entanglement of unjust social formations and epistemic practice, exemplied by Miranda
Fricker’s concept of ‘epistemic injustice’ and Charles Mills’ concept of ‘epistemologies of
ignorance’. The purpose of my examination is twofold: (i) to reveal some implicit theor-
etical commitments to versions of realism and conceptualism at work in this strand of
thought; (ii) to offer a defense of these commitments towards the end of defending a
critical social epistemology.
In section 2, I offer a survey of the critical strand of social epistemology I have in mind,
with the aim of drawing out consistent yet undertheorized commitments to realism and
conceptualism in that body of literature. I show that although these commitments are
relied upon and, at times, explicitly avowed, a thoroughgoing defense is lacking. In
sections 3 through 5, I borrow some insights from John McDowell to build up a concep-
tion of the ‘space of reasons’ that can accommodate these twin commitments. In section 6,
I return to the work of Mills, showing howMcDowell’s conception of the space of reasons
requires critical revision to account for cases of structural ignorance and false belief.
I conclude that McDowell and Mills’ positions reinforce one another, producing a power-
ful model for theorizing epistemic injustice.
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2. realism and conceptualism in critical social epistemology
While the insight that our epistemic practices are socially conditioned is not new,1 recent
work in what we could call critical social epistemology – exemplied by Charles Mills,
Linda Martín Alcoff, José Medina, and Miranda Fricker – is distinguished by its focus
on epistemic practices that undergird unjust social formations through the systematic
production of ignorance and false belief.2 Critical social epistemology offers analyses of
unjust social formations by approaching them at a distinctly epistemological level,
focusing on ways in which certain forms of knowledge are excluded from public exchange,
and how the epistemic authority of certain would-be knowers is either denied or dimin-
ished, not simply as the result of contingent epistemic failures, but in ways structurally
connected with unjust conditions themselves.3 Such analyses have resulted in the demar-
cation of several analytically distinct forms of “epistemic injustice.” In Epistemic Injustice,
Fricker (2007) diagnoses cases of “testimonial injustice,” unfair deations of one’s epi-
stemic credentials on the basis of identity prejudice, and “hermeneutical injustice,” unfair
differential access to interpretive resources appropriate for one’s social experience. While
Fricker focuses on ways in which a discriminated-against group is marginalized from full
epistemic participation, Mills (1997, 1998, 2007) has attempted to reveal epistemic in-
justice working in the opposite direction, focusing on how those benetting from oppres-
sion maintain forms of ignorance and false belief in themselves in order to sustain
oppressive practices, an epistemic phenomenon he refers to as an “epistemology of ignor-
ance” (Mills 1997: 18). Mills argues that certain race-based forms of ignorance and false
belief persist because, though cognitively dysfunctional, they play roles that are psycho-
logically and socially functional. For example, the representation of Native Americans
as stateless savages living in an undeveloped wilderness, though cognitively dysfunctional
given its divergence from the reality of a people with established forms of government and
agriculture, nonetheless played a socially functional role in the classical period of
European expansionism as a conceptual tool for justifying imperialism (Mills 2007:
26–7). The myth of the savage is a socially functional cognitive dysfunction, getting reality
wrong while nonetheless shaping reality, a combination placing Mills’ idea of an
1 For instance, we nd consistent recognition of the social conditioning of epistemic practices in Aristotle
(1984). The clearest example of this recognition is his insistence on the habituated nature of the intel-
lectual virtues, which require an ethical upbringing for their development (Nicomachean Ethics, Book
VI). He also consistently notes the relevance of social class distinctions for the development of different
forms of knowledge. See, e.g., his statement inMetaphysics, Book I, 981b13-24 that mathematics arose
in Egypt as a result of the leisure time afforded to the priestly caste.
2 An already classic reference is Mills’ The Racial Contract (1997), where the important notions of
“epistemologies of ignorance” and “inverted epistemology” are introduced as part of an account of
race-based forms of epistemic injustice. Mills expands on the social epistemological themes of The
Racial Contract in Mills (1998, 2007). The essays collected in Sullivan and Tuana’s Race and
Epistemologies of Ignorance (2007) provide a good overview of social epistemology from the perspec-
tive of critical race theory. See in particular Alcoff (2007) and Spelman (2007). Miranda Fricker’s
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (2007) has also become an essential reference
in critical social epistemology. For critical discussions of Fricker’s book, see the book symposia in
Ibarra (2008), Goldman (2010) and Bohman (2011). The most expansive work to date on this topic,
which critically synthesizes the approaches of Mills, Alcoff, Fricker, and many others is Medina (2013).
3 For a helpful overview of the evolution of contemporary social epistemology to this point, by way of
nineteenth-century Marxism and Quine, see Mills (2007: 13–17).
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“epistemology of ignorance” in line with classic conceptions of ideology.4 The successor
to the myth of the savage in contemporary society is, on Mills’ analysis, the ideology of
colorblindness, the formal attribution of equality to all while denying the need to address
persistent inequalities aficting present society by the injustices of the past, e.g., slavery
and Jim Crow (Mills 2007: 28). The critical thrust of this strand of social epistemology
arises from its attempt to diagnose these constructions of ignorance and false belief as sub-
stantively nourished by the very unjust social formations they work to hide from view.
“Testimonial injustice,” “hermeneutical injustice,” and “epistemologies of ignorance”
constitute the beginning of a typology of general forms of epistemic injustice that critical
social epistemology attempts to lay bare.5
A striking feature consistently recurring in critical social epistemology is a commitment
to a robust form of realism (Mills 1997: 18 and 129; Alcoff, 2007: 55–7; Fricker 2007: 3;
Mills 2007: 15).6 Mills points out that the very idea of diagnosing some epistemic practice
as systematically encouraging ignorance and false belief relies conceptually upon a
contrasting conception of knowledge, a contrast lost, he writes, “if all claims to truth
were equally spurious, or just a matter of competing discourses” (Mills 2007: 15). To
do its critical work, Mills’ position “lays claim to truth, objectivity, realism, the descrip-
tion of the world as it actually is” (Mills 1997: 129). Mills’ realism is signaled negatively
via the rejection of a “postmodernist” alternative, construed as a hopeless form of epi-
stemic and moral relativism.7 Similarly, Alcoff recommends a postpositivist return to a
notion of “objective reason,” cautioning against “postmodern refusals of reference, rea-
son, or truth” (Alcoff 2007: 57). Notably, in spelling out their realist commitments,
both Mills and Alcoff favor what we could call a “wide” conception of objectivity, one
that does not rely on complete abstraction from an embedded subjective standpoint in
the way some standard “narrow” conceptions of objectivity do.8 Alcoff urges a notion
4 Mills says that The Racial Contract should be viewed “in the spirit of a racially-informed
Ideologiekritik” (Mills 1997: 129). In this spirit, Alcoff draws connections between Mills and the
Frankfurt School. Just as the myth of the savage is cognitively dysfunctional as an anthropological con-
ception yet socially functional within the narrow context of imperialism, critical theorists like
Horkheimer and Adorno diagnose modern instrumental reason as “a dysfunctional cognitive norm,
functional within very narrow parameters of capital accumulation and the maintenance of ideology
but dysfunctional as a reliable, truth-seeking practice” (Alcoff 2007: 50). For two contemporary discus-
sions of ideology as a socially functional cognitive dysfunction, see Haslanger (2012) and Jaeggi (2009).
5 The typology of forms of epistemic injustice has been subject to some debate. One site of dispute has
centered around the relation between “hermeneutical injustice” and “epistemologies of ignorance.”
See, in particular, Mason (2011), Pohlhaus (2012), and Medina (2013). Here I follow Fricker
(2013), who suggests that “hermeneutical injustice” and “epistemologies of ignorance” are best viewed
as analytically distinct forms of epistemic injustice, even if they often overlap and reinforce one another
in actual practice.
6 Medina prefers labels like “polyphonic contextualism” and “pluralism” over “realism,” yet nonetheless
defends a qualied conception of objectivity over relativist alternatives in Medina (2013: ch. 6).
7 Mills does not cite any specic advocates of the postmodernist view he wants to reject, leaving the label
anonymous. A potential candidate is Wendy Brown’s championing of a postmodernist approach to
feminism. See, in particular, Brown (1995), where she urges that though women’s experiences may
be voiced as part of a feminist politics, those voices “cannot be anointed as ‘authentic’ or ‘true’ since
the experience they announce is linguistically contained, socially constructed, discursively mediated,
and never just individually ‘had’” (p. 41).
8 I borrow the contrast between “wider” and “narrower conceptions of objectivity” from Crary (2006:
18–19). For a related defense of a wider conception of objectivity, see McDowell (1998c).
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of objective reason that makes reference not only to what is actual but also to what is pos-
sible within actuality. Being objective involves not only getting things right about social
reality, but also about how we might alter social reality, suggesting that what “is” now
and what “ought” to be are not neatly separated within her wider conception of object-
ivity (Alcoff 2007: 53). In the same spirit, Mills makes clear that the notion of realism
required by a critical social epistemology must be particularly inclusive, as the forms of
ignorance to be diagnosed concern not only matters of fact narrowly construed, but
also forms of distinctlymoral knowledge. He writes that the kinds of race-based ignorance
concerning him are “not merely ignorance of facts withmoral implications but moral non-
knowings, incorrect judgments about the rights and wrongs of moral situations them-
selves” (Mills 2007: 22). We nd a similar commitment to realism about moral value
at work in Fricker’s analysis of the hermeneutical injustice of conditions lacking the crit-
ical concept “sexual harassment,” where what is at stake in voicing one’s experience of
harassment is not simply that some value-neutral set of events has taken place, but more-
over, that the events in question are morally repugnant (Fricker 2007: ch. 7; cf. Fricker
2010: 168–9). So, we consistently nd in critical social epistemology a commitment to
realism in this wide sense that includes moral truth.
Alongside his commitment to realism, Mills adopts the Sellarsian rejection of a “raw
perceptual ‘given,’ completely unmediated by concepts” (Mills 2007: 24). For Mills,
embracing the view that even low-level, pre-reective perceptual engagements with the
world are always already conceptually mediated allows us to appreciate the deep ways
in which race-based prejudice can embed itself in our thinking, distorting even basic
instances of empirical claim-making, memory, and belief-formation. As Mills elaborates
the point, “Perceptions are in general simultaneously conceptions, if only at a very low
level” (Mills 2007: 24). Here, Mills is embracing conceptualism, the view that all rational
activity, from intentional action and higher-order reection all the way down to passive
perceptual engagements, is mediated by concepts. Like his commitment to realism, this
commitment to conceptualism in critical social epistemology is not unique to Mills (see,
e.g., Fricker 2007: 67).
However, simultaneous commitments to conceptualism and realism are notoriously
difcult to hold together, and a defense of this dual commitment has not been sufciently
addressed within the context of critical social epistemology. In Mills’ work in particular,
the commitment to epistemic and moral realism is never given a positive defense.9 Realism
is only announced in a few places as the necessary alternative to the failures of postmod-
ernism: any position that refuses to make use of terms like truth and objectivity will lack
the critical tools to diagnose some epistemic practice as systematically productive of ignor-
ance and false belief. This much seems absolutely right, but the mere rejection of postmod-
ernism tells us nothing about the realism we should take up in its stead. Worse, at times he
employs the language of scheme-content dualism to advance his conception of the way a
realist form of critique might work, as when he writes, “the conceptual array with which
the cognizer approaches the world needs itself to be scrutinized for its adequacy to the
world, for how well it maps the reality it claims to be describing” (Mills 2007: 24). As
9 The most sustained discussion I know in Mills’ work on this issue occurs in Mills (1998: 24–32), where
he argues for the compatibility of beliefs being at once based on evidence and tied to a particular social
standpoint. However, his discussion there does not explicitly raise the question of whether this entitles
us to a “realist” perspective.
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I will discuss below, such suggestions are at best misleading and at worst incoherent given
the contrast drawn between the order of the conceptual and the order of the real.10 The
contrast is, moreover, internally inconsistent with Mills’ own avowal of conceptualism,
the view that minded engagement with reality is exhaustively conceptual.
The theoretical underpinnings of a critical social epistemology that is at once concep-
tualist and realist thus need to be made explicit. I approach this problem by bringing crit-
ical social epistemology into conversation with another important trend in contemporary
epistemology exemplied by McDowell. The Sellarsian image of the “space of reasons”
McDowell draws upon is emphatically social, recognizing the ways in which social embed-
dedness invariably conditions epistemic practices while preserving the idea that the knowl-
edge comprising this space can be credited as objective. Moreover, McDowell defends a
conception of objectivity wide enough to accommodate the idea of moral knowledge in
a way that matches Mills’ realist aspirations. However, McDowell’s position is also lim-
ited, notably by a lack of attention paid to precisely the questions of injustice that are
the central preoccupation of critical social epistemology. Hence, after drawing resources
from McDowell to strengthen Mills’ position, I continue their engagement by critically
bringing Mills’ work to bear on McDowell.
3. ideal or non-ideal?
Sellars introduces the phrase, “the logical space of reasons” in his famous essay,
“Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” as part of a discussion of the inherently
normative character of knowledge. There, he says, “in characterizing an episode or
state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or
state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify
what one says” (Sellars 1997: §36). That is, in referring to some episode or state as an
instance of knowledge, we are ascribing to it a particular kind of normative authority,
namely, that it can be legitimately employed in practices of epistemic justication. The
space of reasons refers to this space of normative authority, to that network of norms gov-
erning what counts as a reason for what, what counts as an instance of knowing, and who
counts as a knower.
In order to home in on the form of objectivity we need, it will be helpful to distinguish
between ideal and non-ideal versions of the space of reasons, defending the latter over the
former. We can take as an example of the former a view put forward by Peter Railton
(1997) as part of a defense of his brand of moral realism. He offers us an idealization
procedure that can be performed on any individual A to arrive at a formal conception
of A’s “objective interests.” One’s objective interests are not merely one’s arbitrary sub-
jective preferences, but rather indicate what one has objective reason to do. We can arrive
at A’s objective interests by adding to the concrete individual A “unqualied cognitive and
imaginative powers, and full factual and nomological information about his physical and
psychological constitution, capacities, circumstances, history, and so on” (Railton 1997:
10 Criticisms of scheme-content dualism extend at least from Hegel to contemporary epistemology (see,
e.g., Davidson 1974; McDowell 1996; Hegel 1977: Introduction). More directly with regard to Mills,
it is on the grounds of such a dualism that Harvey Cormier (2007) levels his criticisms of the idea of an
“epistemology of ignorance.”
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142). This addition yields “A + ,” an idealized version of Awho enjoys complete and vivid
knowledge of herself, the world, and awlessly functioning rational faculties. If we ask A+
what she would want her non-idealized self to want or seek, given A’s actual condition,
the answer A+ gives will yield A’s objective interests, i.e., what A has objective reason
to pursue, irrespective of her actual, potentially awed, and merely subjective interests.
The possibility of A’s maturation into a competent agent is underwritten by feedback
mechanisms contributing to a process of practical learning: through experience, A’s
subjective interests may gradually come to approximate A + ’s interests, at least in a partial
fashion.
Railton employs the same idealization procedure to arrive at a conception of objective
moral reasons, with the difference that the interests in question are taken to be that of a
social group as a whole (Railton 1997: 150). The assumption of “full and vivid in-
formation” provides the same kind of idealization that generated the idealized individual,
A + , this time considering the objective good of all involved. So what is objectively mor-
ally good in a given situation is whatever would be collectively adopted as the best course
of action by a democratically organized group of “A + ” versions of ourselves deliberating
over how best to navigate our non-idealized condition.
Why isn’t the space of reasons not like this? Why not interpret the rational requirements
comprising that space as “there in any case” in the sense that they would be recognized as
the right reasons if we had full and vivid knowledge of ourselves and our world? Indeed,
McDowell’s own formulation of the rational requirements comprising “the ethical” may
invite precisely this kind of reading.11 Though the terms would depart from Railton’s
vocabulary, the logic of idealization in the case of the space of reasons would be the
same: take some actual moral agent, add to her a repertoire of conceptual capacities admit-
ting no signicant lack, and the reasons to which she is responsive can be understood as
the objective reasons of the actual moral agent, whether or not she is actually responsive to
those reasons. From there, the space of reasons could be formally dened as the totality of
such objective reasons. “Epistemologies of ignorance” could be understood as systematic-
ally obscuring this space of objective reasons, and criticized on the latter’s basis.
It is tempting to interpret the space of reasons this way because it offers a simple model
for thinking about the existence of reasons responsive to our particular needs, yet which
may transcend the set of reasons we are presently in a position to grasp. Moreover, the
idealized picture seems to translate well into cases of epistemic injustice. When we give
a retrospective account of a moral wrong prior to the discursive shift allowing us to articu-
late that wrong explicitly, as in the case of sexual harassment prior to the development of
the term “sexual harassment” in the mid-seventies, we want to say that justications for
our taking it to be wrong were part of the space of reasons prior to our collective realiza-
tion of that fact. And one way of accounting for their being “there in any case” would be
to say they are part of the set of moral reasons we would have recognized if we were idea-
lized versions of ourselves, if we truly and vividly knew ourselves and our world.
We can see what is wrong with this picture by reecting on a feature Railton does not,
namely, the kinds of transformations accompanying A’s gradual learning process con-
cerning what counts as a reason for what, which interests are really desirable and
11 “The ethical is a domain of rational requirements, which are there in any case, whether or not we are
responsive to them. We are alerted to these demands by acquiring appropriate conceptual capacities”
(McDowell 1996: 82).
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valuable. In McDowell’s writings this process goes under the heading of Bildung, our
gradual emergence into the space of reasons as children through our induction into lan-
guage and later as adults through reective renements of our inherited conceptions of
the space of reasons (McDowell 1996: 84, 87–8). A’s asymptotic approximation of A+
is gured in Railton as the acquisition of atomistic bits of knowledge standing there,
formed in advance of any transformative process of Bildung. The very idea that A’s object-
ive interests are simply those interests A+ would want A to have presupposes no trans-
formation would take place in the very nature of those interests, and hence the reasons
they embody, as part of A’s coming to grasp those objective interests and reasons through
a process of maturation and learning. This presupposition, however, falsely abstracts the
space of reasons from the very process of Bildung that brings us into its midst.
Articulating our interests and the value of our interests (by developing, for instance,
new moral categories like “sexual harassment”) is not like merely designative forms of
predication, which take certain properties as independent of one’s articulating them
(Taylor 1985b: 218–19). Rather, as Charles Taylor puts the point, “articulations are
attempts to formulate what is initially inchoate, or confused, or badly formulated. But
this kind of formation or reformulation does not leave its object unchanged. To give a cer-
tain articulation is to shape our sense of what we desire or what we hold important in a
certain way” (Taylor 1985a: 36). Articulation follows an expressive logic, meaning that
what it expresses is not something wholly determined in advance of the expression, but
rather comes to be what it is at least partially as the result of expression. The subject of
self-interpretation is simultaneously the object of interpretation, and so we can refer to
a “subject-object” of self-interpretation. Insofar as the subject-object of self-interpretation
is undergoing the activity of self-interpretation, it is not static but rather undergoing a
change via that very process.
Take, for example, two friends attempting to articulate the meaning and value of their
friendship after a ght. Insofar as their sitting together to articulate their friendship is itself
a signicant event in the history of the very friendship being interpreted, their acts of self-
interpretation will not leave the object unchanged. Rather, the act of articulating the
friendship is part of what the friendship is becoming. In this kind of evolving, self-
referential case, it makes no sense to say our objective interests concerning our friendship
are those interests held by “I-plus” and “you-plus” versions of ourselves in advance of any
concrete efforts on the part of our non-ideal selves to come to a genuine understanding of
the meaning of our situation. This is fully consistent with the idea that our articulations
concerning the nature of the object can range from the discerning to the deluded and
so, even as the object evolves, there is a meaningful sense in which we can speak of
being objective about the matter at hand.
We can see this expressive logic of articulation at work in an exchange between Fricker
and Alcoff concerning the effects transformations in language have in conditions of her-
meneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when a group is excluded from devel-
oping shared interpretive resources, and so is put at an unfair disadvantage in making
sense of experiences important to that group. In developing this concept, Fricker is con-
cerned with the possibility of our existing discursive resources preempting someone’s
speaking the truth about one’s social situation, say, that one has been sexually harassed.
Taking off from Fricker’s metaphorical assertion that hermeneutical lacunas are like
“holes in the ozone” (Fricker 2007: 161),12 Alcoff says she “wonders if this implies a real-
ist account of meaning as reference to already existing, fully formed objects, objects
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existing, like global warming, whether they are acknowledged by this season’s political
administration or not” (Alcoff 2010: 136). Against this strong realist view, Alcoff suggests
an alternative echoing precisely the concept of articulation:
[O]ur ability to name experiences can in some cases change their shape and their affective texture.
Consider again the case of sexual harassment, in which the term we use to classify the experience
changes it from amorphous or generic aggravation to a specic and remediable injustice, or from
‘women’s lot in life’ to communally sanctioned harm. There is a rather sensitive relationship
between the way life appears and feels, and the conceptual repertoire we have available to us to
describe it. And changes in the terms by which we bring experiences under a description can affect
the actual things themselves – especially in so far as these are experiences – that are referred to by
the terms. (Alcoff 2010: 136)
In her response, Fricker agrees with Alcoff’s suggestion, clarifying her view by suggesting a
form of realism that can accommodate the transformative effects articulation may have on
its object. According to this more sophisticated realism, we can insist upon the reality of
someone’s having been sexually harassed prior to the development of the critical concept,
“sexual harassment,” insofar as the resources for constructing that concept are “imma-
nent in our collective hermeneutical resources” (Fricker 2010: 168). By this she means
that the availability of a web of related and already developed concepts and norms – bur-
geoning notions of sexism, discrimination, non-sexual forms of harassment, etc. – allow
an experience to come forth as meaningful in ways that reects one’s objective condition
even if it cannot be given the precise label, “sexual harassment.” In this sense, she says, she
is happy to be called a “realist” about social phenomena, for “it is entirely possible to have
experiences whose content is shaped by meanings that we are not yet (individually or col-
lectively) able to make explicit in sharply focused reections or communicative
exchanges” (Fricker 2010: 168). Though at rst glance Alcoff’s insistence on the trans-
formative effects of naming something might appear incongruous with Fricker’s realism,
deeper consideration shows them to be compatible. In light of the expressive logic of
articulation, it should seem natural that a single view can simultaneously accommodate
the transformative nature of articulation and a realist sensitivity to something we can nei-
ther master nor will away through articulation.
Acts of self-interpretation, individual or collective, are attempts to articulate some cor-
ner of the space of reasons that has to do with who we are. In these kinds of self-referential
cases, the space of reasons is transformed by our very efforts to articulate it. Yet it would
be a non sequitur to move from this expressive thesis to the further claim that our com-
mitment to realism ought to be jettisoned. That the layout of the space of reasons evolves
alongside our efforts to articulate it in no way contradicts the realist claim that there exist
objective reasons that are not simply the constructions of subjective spontaneity. We avoid
this contradiction as long as we are able to distinguish between (i) the expressive idea that
our efforts of articulation have transformative effects upon an objective space of reasons
within which knowers are embedded and (ii) the anti-realist idea that our efforts of
12 The metaphor takes place in the context of a discussion of the fact that hermeneutical injustice, though
affecting the vocabularies and discursive styles of an entire linguistic community, disproportionately
affects certain marginalized groups rather than others: “Hermeneutical lacunas are like holes in the
ozone – it’s the people who live under them that get burned. Fundamentally, then, hermeneutical
injustice is a kind of structural discrimination” (p. 161).
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articulation are the exhaustive source of a subjectively constructed space of reasons. The
former sits well with the realist premise that our efforts of articulation aspire to be ration-
ally responsive to the way things are, so long as we keep in mind the expressive point that
“the way things are” may be transformed by human activity, including the human activity
of articulation. The argument I have offered here, and the position Fricker embraces in her
response to Alcoff, lead us to this expressive realism. Hence, we can remain realists about
the existence of social phenomena like sexual harassment while taking on board Alcoff’s
point that newly developed conceptual capacities like “sexual harassment” can have
deeply transformative effects upon those very phenomena.
The idealized variation of the space of reasons is, ultimately, self-defeating, since it
treats objective reasons as static, as if unaffected by our transformative efforts to grasp
and make use of those reasons. This means that whatever we mean by the “space of rea-
sons,” we can be referring to nothing other than our actual, non-idealized world insofar as
it is rationally and ethically meaningful.
4. social rationalism or non-traditional empiricism?
I now want to consider two different non-ideal readings of the space of reasons, so we may
continue to home in on the version of the metaphor best suiting critical social epistemol-
ogy. On the one hand is a view we can refer to as social rationalism, defended by Robert
Brandom, which depicts the content of the space of reasons as exhaustively determined by
socially instituted practices of justication and warrant (Brandom 1994, 2000). On this
view, the world only bears normative authority over thought and action insofar as we
grant it that authority as an expression of normative commitments we give to ourselves.
On the other hand is a view of the space of reasons as amenable to a non-traditional
empiricism, as McDowell puts it.13 On this view, normative authority in general – from
epistemic authority to moral authority – inheres in the world of objects and situations,
such that part of what it means to describe empirically some feature of the world already
involves, internal to that description, an appreciation of its normative signicance. This
allows room for the idea that we may have empirical grounds for “warping a prior con-
ception of the topography of intelligibility” (McDowell 1996: 187).
It can seem difcult to give an empiricist reading of the space of reasons, given that
Sellars introduces the metaphor by way of a contrast with empirical description.14
When we characterize something or someone in epistemic terms, as an instance of know-
ing or as a knower, we are saying something about the kind of normative authority that
thing or person has in the context of practices of justication and warrant. Rebecca Kukla
helpfully illustrates this point by noting the difference between “p is green” and “p is
13 This is a theme running throughout McDowell’s writings. See, especially, McDowell (1996, 2009b,
2009c). McDowell’s ethical writings, many of which center on developing Aristotle’s concept of
phronesis as a perceptual capacity, are deeply relevant here, as a non-traditional empiricism includes
the idea that concrete situations present themselves as already ethically signicant, and that we can
come to appreciate that signicance through experience. See McDowell (1998a, especially essays 2,
3, and 6).
14 “[I]n characterizing an episode or state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description
of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to
justify what one says” (Sellars 1997: §36).
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evidence” (Kukla 2000: 209–10). The former is an empirical description of p, whereas the
latter is not simply a claim about some state of affairs, but is a claim about the sort of epi-
stemic authority p has in the context of practices of justication and warrant, a distinctly
normative ascription as opposed to an empirical description of p. A similar contrast
between normative ascription and empirical description seems to hold for persons.
Unlike empirical descriptions of persons (e.g., “She has ten ngers”), epistemic character-
izations of persons (e.g., “She is a knower”) are distinctly normative, making claims about
the kinds of authority and responsibility we recognize that person as possessing.
Characterizing someone as a knower carries with it normative expectations, e.g., that
her statements be supported with reasons and that she may legitimately demand reasons
from others for what they say and do. Making an empirical description of someone, say,
that she has ten ngers, may be a move within the space of reasons, but it is not, unlike
normative ascription, a claim about the layout of the space of reasons. So, placing some-
one in the space of reasons seems conceptually distinct from giving an empirical descrip-
tion of that person.
If we hold fast to this contrast, we are led fairly naturally towards the social rationalist
reading of the space of reasons. According to the contrast, normative authority is not
found in the empirical world, and so when we ask about something’s epistemic normative
status, e.g., “Is x really an instance of knowing?” we will not nd conrmation or dis-
conrmation by looking at the world. This is because normative ascriptions such as “x
is an instance of knowing” are not claims about items in the empirical world, but are
assertions about what we are permitted and restricted from doing with some episode or
state in practices of reason-giving. Statements like “p is evidence” or “S is a knower, cap-
able of offering and receiving reliable testimony” are part of a mapping out of epistemic
normative space, an outlining of the permissions and restrictions constituting the norms
governing our practices of justication and warrant. These justicatory practices, in
turn, are the developed result of acts of collective self-legislation, our collectively taking
certain episodes and states to be authoritative, our collectively recognizing persons as
knowers capable of testimony, and so forth. And thus we are led towards social
rationalism.
Non-traditional empiricism, by contrast, develops a picture of the space of reasons that
questions the hard contrast between normative ascription and empirical description. On
this view, it is only through a person’s embodied, expressive actions that she manifests
her status as a knower, so that through material events like speech and writing, as well
as postures and facial expressions we view as contemplative, her being a knower is directly
perceived. In this sense, we empirically perceive (and misperceive) others as knowers,
which is simultaneously to see others as bearing normative authority. We can deepen
this by following a line of thought in McDowell’s Mind and World, namely that the nor-
mative authority we bear as knowers can be understood as located within empirical real-
ity, insofar as our epistemic capacities are part of our being the kinds of animals we are
(McDowell 1996: lecture IV). Drawing from the concept of second nature, McDowell
urges that knowers emerge from yet are irreducible to rst nature, such that participating
in activities of knowing and reasoning do not bring us outside nature but rather form part
of “our own special way of living an animal life” (McDowell 1996: 65). Our emergence as
rational knowers is guided by the kinds of education (Bildung) that characterize our
induction into language and tradition as children. If we take knowing to be second natural
in this sense, then to recognize another person as a rational knower just is recognizing her
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as participating in an activity typical of our species. Further, if recognizing someone as a
knower is just part of what it means to recognize her as a normally developed example of
the kind of animal she is, we are not far from the idea that ascriptions of epistemic fact
(“She is a knower”) are empirical claims, analogous to the manner in which our recogniz-
ing a bird as capable of ight is an empirical claim.15 Yet recognizing someone as a
knower, although empirical in this sense, continues to carry with it normative expecta-
tions. So recognizing someone as a knower is an instance in which empirical description
and normative ascription invariably converge.
On this view, experience can disrupt our received conceptions of what or who counts
as normatively authoritative. Consider the case of “S is a knower, capable of offering and
receiving reliable testimony,” transposed into the context of what Fricker calls “testimo-
nial injustice,” when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deated level of credibility to a
speaker’s word (Fricker 2007: ch. 1). In an extreme case, testimonial injustice amounts
to one’s wrongful displacement from the space of reasons. On the non-traditional empiri-
cist account, we can understand the perpetrator of testimonial injustice as missing certain
objective features of the world, namely, those expressive acts manifesting S’s status as an
authoritative knower. Insofar as those expressive acts are themselves already normative,
we can point to them as justications when we attempt to criticize such cases of testimo-
nial injustice as, precisely, unjust. Whilemany empirical features of a person may be irrele-
vant to the question of her epistemic authority (e.g., her having ten ngers), it will also be
precisely her epistemic deeds in the empirical world that publicly display her authority and
hence performatively contradict the claim that she is not an authoritative knower. In our
judgment of such deeds, our attentiveness to her empirical actuality and her normative
authority converge, and so our failure to appreciate one is a failure to appreciate the other.
Whereas for social rationalism our socially established epistemic practices exhaustively
determine the layout of the space of reasons, for non-traditional empiricism, these inher-
ited schemes are rationally vulnerable to experiential episodes capable of warping the top-
ography of intelligibility. Our childhood acquisition of language is, for McDowell, the
primary way in which we make our rst steps into the space of reasons. He writes, “In
being initiated into a language, a human being is introduced into something that already
embodies putatively rational linkages between concepts, putatively constitutive of the lay-
out of the space of reasons, before she comes on the scene” (McDowell 1996: 125). He
goes on, “[A] natural language, the sort of language into which human beings are rst
initiated, serves as a repository of tradition, a store of historically accumulated wisdom
about what is a reason for what” (p. 126). Language is not simply a tool for communi-
cation, or a set of designative terms, but bears in its grammar a socially developed articu-
lation of rational space. To that extent, it bears the imprint of past experiences and
reections upon those experiences, insofar as those experiences and reections have
gone into the gradual, historical shaping of a collectively established topography of the
space of reasons.
15 This is not to rule out that such ascriptions involve a more complex logic than empirical claims not
targeting living or rational beings. The additional complexity is brought in by the fact that we
make such ascriptions of both epistemic fact and animal capacities (e.g., ight) not individualistically
but in light of a wider context, namely, the form of life in question. See Michael Thompson (2008) for
a discussion of the special turn thought takes when judging forms of life.
epistemic injustice in the space of reasons
episteme volume 12–1 85
Though this is not McDowell’s way of speaking about it, we can put the point in terms
of memory. Through the historical development of language we memorialize certain
experiences and reections of previous generations in ways that render them discursively
inheritable for the next generation. Language offers to the generation inheriting it a stand-
ing set of purportedly rational relations that serves as one’s initial orientation in the space
of reasons in early childhood. This is, at the very least, a double-edged sword. In an opti-
mistic mood we can say with McDowell that language, insofar as it memorializes the
experiences and reections of past generations, embodies “a store of historically accumu-
lated wisdom of what counts as a reason for what.” In a less optimistic mood, or perhaps
a realistic one, we will say that the fact that our initial orientation in the space of reasons is
only made possible by our inheritance of a language as it already stands is precisely why
epistemologies of ignorance can take such an unshakable hold on us. It is not only the wis-
dom of past generations that is memorialized in language, but also the folly, the blind
spots, the prejudice, the inuence of abused power.
McDowell’s emphasis on the role of inheriting a language and tradition is thus import-
antly distinct from the social rationalist’s insistence that things and persons only appear as
normatively authoritative insofar as they conform to socially established epistemic norms.
McDowell urges a conception of the space of reasons that is open to “radical ethical reec-
tion” (McDowell 1998d: 189), specically in response to experiential episodes that open
our eyes to forms of normative authority our received frames cannot presently accommo-
date without remainder. His only insistence is that radical reection cannot be taken up
from a vantage that positions itself wholly outside any received language or tradition.
This rejection of validation from an external standpoint is compatible with the possibility
of radical critical reection, which McDowell illustrates with the famous image of “the
mariner repairing his ship while aoat” (McDowell 1998b: 36). Following this image, crit-
ical reection upon our inherited conceptions takes place from a position within that very
inheritance, altering but not suspending it entirely. In this way, the languages and tradi-
tions by which we are inducted into the space of reasons are socially and historically devel-
oped yet empirically revisable. This preserves the centrality of the social mediation of
knowledge while holding onto the idea of empirical constraints on knowledge.
5. realism and conceptualism
For Mills, conceptualism helps make sense of the ways conceptual arrays shaped by epis-
temologies of ignorance – exemplied by the myth of the savage and colorblind ideology –
achieve far-reaching and persistent, distorting effects at the levels of perception, memory,
testimony, and beyond (Mills 2007: 23). Yet Mills is not always consistent in how his con-
ceptualism works, and sometimes he speaks as though he favors a picture according to
which our conceptual arrays stand on one side of a gap between our knowing activity
and the world we try to know. In one of the more egregious passages along these lines,
Mills describes how critical scrutiny of our existing conceptual arrays should be under-
stood: “the conceptual array with which the cognizer approaches the world needs itself
to be scrutinized for its adequacy to the world, for how well it maps the reality it claims
to be describing” (Mills 2007: 24). The “mapping” image suggests a dualist picture of the
way conceptual array and world stand to one another. On this dualist view, we could
diagnose some conceptual array as inadequate by demonstrating that it fails to “map”
matthew congdon
86 episteme volume 12–1
accurately the reality it purports to describe. However, if we take seriously Mills’ initial
claim that even low-level perceptions are conceptually mediated, it will not be the case
that we can test the adequacy of a conceptual array by comparing it to how things
stand in the world, for our very reference to how things stand will itself require mediation
by a conceptual array, which will in turn require critical scrutiny.
From here, some unattractive options arise. The rst and least attractive is to admit an
innite regress follows when our picture involves testing the adequacy of the conceptual
arrays that are employed in testing our conceptual arrays.
A second option is to avoid the regress by relinquishing the commitment to conceptu-
alism, maintaining that we can check the adequacy of a conceptual array by asking how
well it maps non-conceptual reality. Yet, if we relinquish that commitment, Mills’ image of
mapping forces us to fall back onto a version of a raw, unmediated empirical given. This is
not a serious option if we reject, as Mills does, that there is some conceptually unmediated
point of access to the world from which epistemic and social critique takes place.
A third option, if we reject the foundationalist appeal to an unmediated given, is to
maintain a variation of conceptualism while relinquishing realism. With this move, the
idea that conceptual arrays are supposed to “map” faithfully something like reality
drops out completely and the regress problem is avoided, for it was only the dualist
image of mapping that introduced the problem in the rst place. This option will of course
be unpalatable to Mills, since it reintroduces precisely the kind of anti-realism he views as
an “epistemological and theoretical dead end” (Mills 1997: 129). Nonetheless, it is a
familiar strategy. Donald Davidson famously criticizes the dualism of conceptual scheme
and empirical content in favor of a “coherentist” view, according to which “nothing can
count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief” (Davidson 1989: 310), mean-
ing that a particular belief’s epistemic status is judged according to how well it coheres
with an established body of beliefs. Harvey Cormier (2007) has objected to Mills in pre-
cisely this spirit, urging that Mills’ appeal to reality as providing a critical foothold against
epistemologies of ignorance begs the question, preferring “coherentism” in its place. Yet it
is precisely under conditions of systematic ignorance that potentially subversive percep-
tions, memories, and histories are ltered out as “incoherent” (Mills 2007: 25). The
fact that a particular web of beliefs is productive of oppression is not, at least on the
face of it, incompatible with the internal coherence of that web, and so a coherence theory
of truth and knowledge will not provide the kind of critical force needed to diagnose epis-
temologies of ignorance.
Reconciling realism and conceptualism allows us to avoid these unsatisfactory options.
McDowell (1996) suggests their reconciliation as a way of avoiding “the Myth of the
Given,” the view that conceptual activity is grounded in non-conceptual contact with
the world. The problem with the Myth is that non-conceptual episodes, such as causal
impacts upon my body, cannot serve as reasons (as opposed to mere exculpations) for
holding a belief. The very availability to rational thought of some state or episode depends
upon its being, in principle, conceptually discernible, i.e., something that can be picked out
of the perceptual manifold as an intentional object of awareness. For some episode or state
to be non-conceptual in these terms is for it to be essentially lacking the minimal form
allowing a rational being to apprehend it as determinate. But if that is what something’s
being non-conceptual involves, its being non-conceptual entails its in principle unavail-
ability to the discernment of thought. Hence, a non-conceptual episode or state cannot
provide reasons for belief, since non-conceptual content is unavailable to thought. Only
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those episodes and states that are already conceptual provide reasons. Therefore, the
rational activity that characterizes the space of reasons, including perceptual experience,
is necessarily conceptual all the way down, yet not in any way that threatens the idea
of objective purport. For it is precisely by virtue of conceptual mediation that
object-oriented thought is possible at all. Realism is not simply reconcilable with concep-
tualism, but systematically depends upon it.
Though Mills ultimately mishandles his own realist and conceptualist commitments,
McDowell’s position offers another way to preserve these commitments in a way that
ts well with his overall aims. This makes reective criticism more complicated than the
image of “mapping” suggests, yet insofar as it preserves the idea of conceptually mediated
yet direct exposure to the authority of objects, it opens up a non-dualist view of objectively
grounded critique consistent with Mills’ realism.
6. mcdowell’s limitations
I have been building up a conception of the “space of reasons” metaphor with the goal of
strengthening undertheorized elements in critical social epistemology as exemplied by
Mills. Clearly, however, the line of support needs to run in the other direction as well,
and so I conclude by showing how Mills’ social epistemology contains insights requiring
important revisions to McDowell’s conception of the space of reasons.
First, discussions surrounding Sellars and the space of reasons unfortunately fall within
what Mills describes as the tendency in contemporary epistemology to remain “blithely
indifferent to the possible cognitive consequences of class, racial, or gender situatedness”
(Mills 2007: 13). If Mills’ broader thesis about the epistemological underpinnings of racial
domination are correct, and race-based conceptual arrays account for widespread and sys-
tematic forms of cognitive failure throughout history, then mainstream epistemology’s
recurrent silence about matters of race cannot simply be shrugged off as a failure to
omit some particular detail among others, but can be viewed as symptomatic of its own
deep entanglement with racial domination. While “space of reasons” epistemology is cer-
tainly sufciently social in character to accommodate in principle the possible cognitive
consequences of injustice, there can be no denying that Sellars, McDowell, and those
who work within their tradition are predominantly silent on issues of racial, class-, and
gender-based injustices as they structure epistemic practice.16
I know of only one passage in McDowell where such issues are cautiously broached,
and even there it is only as part of an argument against the idea that full mutuality of rec-
ognition is a necessary precondition for genuinely world-directed thought. He asks,
rhetorically,
Are we to suppose that members of downtrodden minorities, say, or those who oppress them, can-
not have their empirical thinking rationally controlled by objects they perceive? No doubt restric-
tions on freedom to act can have effects on freedom of thought. But it would be absurd to claim
16 There are, of course, some exceptions to this tendency in the literature. See, e.g., Crary (2001), which
draws upon the Sellarsian metaphor as part of the argument for “the possibility of a space of reasons
which women and men can fruitfully cohabitate” (p. 379).
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that there is no thinking, and hence no involvement of capacities for thought in perceptual experi-
ence, unless there is full mutuality of recognition. (McDowell 2009a: 200)17
McDowell’s claim here is so minimal – namely, that it would be too much to say that
oppressors or oppressed groups completely lack objective thought owing to conditions
of oppression – that it is difcult to disagree with his suggestion. Indeed, it would be a
caricature of the concept of ideology, or of the idea of an “epistemology of ignorance,”
to paint it as utterly objectivity-eclipsing. My point in raising this passage is not to contest
the thesis it puts forward, but to point out that McDowell’s one brief reference to the epi-
stemic conditions of “downtrodden minorities” – especially when considered in the face of
the rich contributions of recent critical social epistemology – gestures towards an area that
is at once deeply relevant to his own thinking and radically undertheorized.
Secondly, McDowell’s conception of language as “a repository of tradition, a store of
historically accumulated wisdom about what is a reason for what” requires modication
to reect tradition’s simultaneously standing as a store of historically accumulated resis-
tances to genuine knowing, of historically accumulated unwisdom about what is a reason
for what. To be sure, McDowell acknowledges this in some brief remarks, for instance
when he notes that one’s “way of thinking, including its implicit standards for self-
scrutiny, may have hitherto unnoticed defects, such as parochialism or reliance on bad
prejudice” (McDowell 1996: 81). Nonetheless, like his brief reference to “downtrodden
minorities,” these are at best vague gestures, and as Mills and others have demonstrated,
the complex ways in which various forms of parochialism and bad prejudice infect our
epistemic practices, including the ways they are linked to social identity, can be subject
to rigorous analysis in their own right. Alcoff helpfully claries this point: “Even in main-
stream epistemology, the topic of ignorance as a species of bad epistemic practice is not
new, but what is new is the idea of explaining ignorance not as a feature of neglectful epi-
stemic practice but as a substantive epistemic practice in itself” (Alcoff 2007: 39). If we
incorporate the insights of McDowell and critical social epistemology into one position,
we are left with the thought that tradition is simultaneously a store of accumulated wis-
dom and resistances to knowing what is a reason for what.
Here it is possible to view McDowell and Mills as placing their respective emphases on
two sides of the same coin. For McDowell, it is only because our engagements with the
world are pervasively conceptual that they can be credited as rational engagements with
objective states of affairs. The very idea of conceptually unmediated content leaves us
without the resources necessary for that content to play a role in rational thought.
Hence, the conceptual mediation of experience is a necessary precondition for
object-oriented thought. For Mills, it is only because our engagements with the world
are pervasively conceptual that epistemologies of ignorance can get a deep grip on our
17 The passage requires some context to understand why McDowell would be driven to deny what it is he
is denying here. The passage comes in the context of a debate with Robert Pippin over the social versus
empirical grounds of epistemic authority. Pippin makes the Hegelian point that mutuality of recogni-
tion in a social space is a necessary precondition for object-oriented thought (Pippin 2005: 215). For
Pippin, McDowell’s idea that empirical thinking is “answerable to the world” is only possible given a
prior answerability to one another. McDowell’s response is to accept that social answerability and
empirical answerability to the world are indeed dialectically entangled, but that the point should
not be overstated such that we claim objective purport is only possible under conditions of full mutu-
ality of recognition.
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epistemic lives at the pre-reective levels of perception and memory. Since our taking the
world as intelligible depends upon possessing a conceptual repertoire that is, in large part,
a social inheritance not of our own choosing, and since that inheritance takes place in a
society structured by relations of dominance and subordination, it follows that our con-
ceptual repertoire is shaped in ways that reect the interests and experiences of dominating
groups (Mills 2007: 24–5; cf. Fricker 2007: ch. 7). If we combine these thoughts, then our
inheritance of a conceptual repertoire is simultaneously a condition of possibility of
objective thought and a condition of possibility of structural ignorance and false belief.
That would seem like a paradox if it were not for the historically evolving and empirically
revisable character of our inherited conceptual repertoires, a point on which McDowell
and Mills agree.
This is wholly compatible with McDowell’s thought yet, once again, undertheorized.
We might begin to remedy this lack by developing theoretical categories tting
McDowell’s overall picture while placing the needed emphasis on the inherent possibility
of epistemologies of ignorance shaping our inherited languages and traditions. For
instance, alongside McDowell’s frequently used category of “conceptual capacities” we
could introduce the notion of “conceptual incapacities.” This would refer not simply to
a potential yet lacking conceptual capacity in one’s conceptual repertoire, but to a sub-
stantive locus of false belief and ignorance in one’s conceptual repertoire. The myth of
the savage, for instance, could be described as involving a network of conceptual incap-
acities, signaling on the one hand that instances in which the myth is employed in justi-
catory practices do indeed draw into operation conceptual activity while on the other
hand that such conceptual activity is playing the substantive role of blocking a clear
view of how things are. With this category we could distinguish between forms of ignor-
ance resulting from our lacking relevant concepts and those resulting from historically
developed and socially reinforced conceptual pathologies.
Third, McDowell speaks of our inheritance of “tradition” in the singular, offering the
misleading idea that our induction into tradition is an induction into something monolith-
ic. McDowell usually returns to this thought when discussing the possibility of critical
reection upon our inherited conceptual repertoires. For instance, he writes, “Even a
thought that transforms a tradition must be rooted in the tradition that it transforms.
The speech that expresses it must be able to be intelligibly addressed to people squarely
placed within the tradition as it stands” (McDowell 1996: 187). The core thought here
is that one cannot achieve a transcendent point of view upon one’s own point of view
to secure for it either an external validation or external conrmation that some transform-
ation of that point of view is warranted. This thought seems absolutely right. Yet phrasing
it in terms of our inability to occupy anything other than a perspective from within a par-
ticular tradition, where “tradition” is taken as a singular entity, risks overlooking the pos-
sibility that heterogeneous perspectives within a tradition create points of dissonance
where critical reection can get a grip.
This is a deep topic in its own right, and rich discussions already exist in critical social
epistemological literature, so here I will just offer one example of the direction this might
take with Mills, who favors a “racial version of standpoint theory” (Mills 1997: 109; cf.
Mills 1998). Mills urges the possibility of heterogeneous takes on tradition, even multiple
perspectives upon tradition within a single person, through an epistemological develop-
ment of W.E.B. Du Bois’ gure of “double-consciousness.” Du Bois writes in The Souls
of Black Folk,
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After the Egyptian and the Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is
a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with a second-sight in this American world, – a
world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the reve-
lation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always
looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that
looks on in amused contempt and pity. (Du Bois 1986: 364)
At least part of what Du Bois is describing here is a sense of epistemic alienation that arises
when one is forced to view oneself, measure oneself, by the standards of a world that is not
of one’s own making, that is of one’s oppressors’ making. Yet despite the confusion and
suffering it may produce, Mills interprets “double-consciousness” as a kind of powerful
and potentially critical epistemic achievement, namely, “a critical cognitive distancing”
from an inherited conceptual repertoire that both underwrites and is an expression of
white supremacy (Mills 2007: 15). It signals burgeoning alternative conceptual repertoires
in critical conict with mainstream epistemic practices. The critical distancing involved
here is not a matter of stepping outside one’s tradition to gain an externally validated
take on that tradition. Yet it does arise from an internal splitting of tradition, an experi-
ential rupture within received ways of thinking. This warrants a shift in McDowell’s man-
ner of speaking about tradition away from monolithic terms. Yet despite his lack of
comment on the topic, a revived, race-based form of standpoint theory would be precisely
in the spirit of a “non-traditional empiricism” that stresses one’s embeddedness in a non-
ideal world, the inseparability of normative and empirical orders, and the meaningfulness
of experiences for which propositional discourse is unprepared. That is, it would be pre-
cisely in the spirit of the conception of the space of reasons I have defended here.18
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